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Withering of the Clans
Following the persistent and grim television pictures 
of starvation in Somalia, the industrialised world has 
rediscovered its charitable soul. The United Nations, 
the European Community, the US and the other 
developed nations have decided to provide relief 
assistance before the entire Somali community 
perishes. Australia has offered $3.5 million towards 
the effort. Some critics have understandably blamed 
the international community for acting too late.
The Somali tragedy has been apparent 
for several years, but the UN and the 
developed world did not pay much 
attention to it  Earlier in 1992 the UN 
was involved in a ceasefire arranged 
between the warring Somali factions. 
UN secretary-general Dr Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, who has a longstand­
ing interest in the Horn of Africa, 
despatched UN assistant secretary- 
general James Jonah to Somalia in 
January to try to persuade the warring 
factions to negotiate. In the same
month the UN Security Council ap­
proved a resolution imposing an arms 
embargo on Somalia and calling on 
the combatants to permit 
humanitarian assistance to reach 
those most in need.
The warring factions did in fact accept 
a ceasefire in New York in February, 
but they immediately flouted it—as 
they had done other ceasefires. 
Prophetically James Jonah warned the 
various factions of the United Somali 
Congress (USC) in early March that
the international community had 
tired of their ceasefire violations, and 
that Somalia might be abandoned al­
together. By the end of March the 
Somali tragedy had been put on the 
backburner by the UN—largely be­
cause the permanent members of the 
UN Security Council (and especially 
the US, UK and France) were more 
interested in the equally serious crisis 
in the Balkans.
It has been estimated that between 
November 1991 and August 1992 
more than 100,000 Somalis lost their 
lives either in the civil war or through 
starvation. If the international com­
munity had intervened nine months 
earlier many lives would have been 
saved and some major problems 
would have been alleviated. The 
trouble with the current gesture is not 
just that it is too late; it is also too little, 
and fails to address the root of the 
problem.
The UN has decided to send 500 
troops to escort food convoys in the 
capital Mogadishu, where at least 200 
people die of starvation every day. But 
even James Jonah admits that such a 
force is too small to be of any use 
outside Mogadishu. If the UN were 
serious about sending food to the 
starving people outside Mogadishu it 
would send not less than 15,000 troops 
to escort food trucks through the anar­
chic conditions of Somalia.
However, starvation in Somalia is just 
one symptom of the tragedy. In fact, it 
is a consequence of the civil war, and 
the civil war itself is a result of clan 
feuds and power struggles. For 
generations the single most important 
factor in Somali society has been the 
clan. Although all Somalis belong to 
one ethnic group and enjoy a sense of 
common identity based on a shared 
culture, clan loyalty often undermines 
the sense of shared nationhood.
It was clan feuds which brought down 
the government of former dictator 
General Mohammed Siad Barre in 
January 1991. The octogenarian Barre, 
who had ruled Somalia with an iron 
fist since coming to power in 1969, had 
sought to transform  Somali 
nationalism from its old segmentary 
state to a modern 'organic' mode. In
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the process he banned clanism, and in 
the early 70s prohibited any reference 
to clans. He adopted the doctrine of 
'scientific socialism' in an effort to 
unite the nation, but in practice 
lineage has continued to determine 
the course of Som alia's political 
development.
Clan and lineage affiliations are also 
vital in obtaining jobs, services and 
favours. Som alia's social and 
economic development, as well as 
political organisation, has traditional­
ly stemmed from lineage systems 
based on one or other of the six major 
clan families— Darod, Digil, Dir, 
Hawiye, Issaq and Rahawein. TTie six 
family groups are further split into 
small clans and lineages; the Hawiye 
clan, for instance, has six sub-clans, 
two of which are sharply divided.
The carnage, chaos and sheer mad­
ness of the past few years stems from 
this structure of Somali society. By the 
time Barre was toppled in January
1991 the country had been sliding 
toward anarchy for more than three 
years. Barre had maintained a 
centralised and authoritarian regime 
that had literally ruined the country. 
The economy was in a shambles, 
political institutions had collapsed, 
corruption was rampant, morale in 
the civil and armed forces was low 
and clanism was very strong. The
situation was so appalling that few 
people had any illusions that Barre's 
fall from grace would bring an imme­
diate end to the suffering or restore 
normal services.
Moreover the resistance groups op­
posed to Barre's rule mirrored the 
anarchic condition of the regime, 
thereby ensuring that the post-Barre 
era would be chaotic. The main resis­
tance forces were again based on 
clans: the Somali National Movement 
(SNM), established in 1981 by the 
Issaq of northern Somalia; the United 
Somali Congress (USC), formed in
1989 by the Hawiye of central 
Somalia; and the Somali Patriotic 
Movement (SPM), created in 1988 by 
the Ogadenis. Increasingly every 
public issue in Somalia came to be 
defined in terms of lineage and clan. It 
was therefore hardly surprising that 
when Barre was toppled by the USC 
in January 1991 the country was 
plunged into even deeper problems.
After Barre's fall the fighting escalated 
and many Somalis fled, seeking 
asylum in neighbouring Dijbouti, 
Ethiopia and Keyna. Barre's succes­
sor, Ali Mahdi Mohammed, sup­
ported by the local wing of the USC, 
had no resources with which to estab­
lish a functioning government. He did 
not even control the capital for more 
than a few months. At present there is
no effective government in 
Mogadishu, as President Mahdi con­
trols only the northern part of the capi­
tal. In the confusion which followed 
the overthrow of the Barre regime 
government offices and foreign em­
bassies were looted, hospitals and 
schools were ravaged and water and 
power supply in Mogadishu were dis­
rupted.
Since 1990 Somalia has been ungov­
ernable. The overthrow of Barre was 
delayed until January 1991 simply be­
cause alliances between power-seek- 
ing clan leaders could not endure. 
Somalia's relative stability in the 70s 
and early 80s depended on Barre's 
skilful manipulation of domestic 
politics. He maintained power by 
regularly suppressing critics and 
detaining opponents, by playing on 
clan interests and rivalries and, oc­
casionally, by buying out opposition 
groups with cash. However by the late 
1980s his military muscle had been 
weakened by inter-clan rivalries. It 
had also become increasingly obvious 
that he had neither the skill to 
manipulate sectional interests nor the 
vision to lead the country quickly out 
of its political and economic crises.
Clan rivalry intensified in the late 
1980s because of government corrup­
tion and the increasing economic 
malaise throughout the country. And
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corruption was rampant because state 
structures in Som alia were un­
developed and extremely weak. There 
were no democratic institutions, and 
there was no accountability on the 
part of political leaders. Somalia's 
economic problems were aggravated 
by Barre's misguided macroeconomic 
policies, by a lack of technical exper­
tise, and by poor project selection and 
implementation. The foreign aid 
Somalia received was not invested in 
profitable ventures, and by the late 
1980s the Somali economy had almost 
ground to a halt.
To make a bad situation worse, by the 
late 1980s Somalia had been deserted 
by all its friends and neglected by all 
but one of the Western powers. 
Washington terminated aid to Somalia 
in the wake of human rights violations 
in 1989. By 1990 Italy was the only 
Western power working with Somalia 
in the hope of containing the civil war, 
reforming the political system and 
putting the economy on a sound foot­
ing. It failed, largely because of 
Somalia's complex political problems, 
rampant corruption, and of course the 
feuding clans.
Barre's defeat in January 1991 ac­
celerated the disintegration of 
Somalia. First, the anti-Barre opposi­
tion had only their interest in the
defeat of Barre in common; other than 
that they hated each other almost as 
much as they did Barre. Second, when 
Barre was overthrown power was im­
mediately assumed by the Hawiye, a 
clan that played virtually no role in the 
anti-Barre struggle until a few months 
before his fall. Third, President Mahdi 
was appointed by the USC without 
consulting the other groups.
Since the overthrow of Barre there 
have been several clan-based civil 
wars in Somalia, and given the frag­
mentation of society it has been hard 
to gauge the direction of the fighting. 
Among the warring guerrilla groups 
now are Barre's own forces, which 
regrouped in southern Somalia and 
have been trying to topple the Mahdi 
regime. This is implausible, yet they 
are still capable of making life hard for 
the new government.
Around Mogadishu the USC has been 
fighting on several fronts—including 
against its own breakaway groups. On 
another front, the USC has had to deal 
with disaffection from the SPM and 
other political groups which have 
been dissatisfied with the post-Barre 
power-sharing arrangement.
After taking power Mahdi had 
proposed a 'conference of national 
reconciliation', but other groups 
refused to attend. The conference was
finally convened in June and July 
1991, but the various political groups 
were still so divided that it was hard 
to see how they would coordinate 
their programs.
Mediation efforts in Somalia have 
failed for several reasons: the various 
clans and sub-clans still hate each 
other vehemently; the dan leaders or 
warlords have virtually no legitimacy 
and can be abandoned by their sup­
porters at any time; and the number of 
clan militias keeps rising. Somalia's 
inter- and intra-clan rivalry can be 
resolved only when clan leaders or 
warlords agree to unite and persuade 
their supporters to do the same. But 
without tangible political and 
economic rewards to show for years of 
fighting, the warlords have been un­
able to persuade their fighters to put 
down arms. In his heyday Barre suc­
ceeded in bribing clan leaders with 
political office and economic rewards, 
but the country is now so poor and 
disorganised that such rewards are no 
longer tenable. In the long term only 
strong state structures, efficient and 
accountable government and ap­
propriate macroeconomic policies 
will save Somalia.
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Jaywalking
It was a momentous event in radio journalism. Brett 
Whiteley had been dead for less than a day and the 
JJJ reporter was hot on the case. Interviewing a 
gallery owner she got to the point: "Just how 
influential was he?"
That's rather typical of JJJ: in pursuit 
of shoehorning a perceived point of 
cultural interest into terms acceptable 
to their idea of a youthful point of 
view, JJJ boil Whiteley down to how 
much you should care he's dead. It's the 
sort of thing you're likely to find every 
day on the station: perhaps well- 
meaning, but often just crass. As 
Australia's one and only 'Youth 
Network' (though Sydney and Mel­
bourne both have male youth- 
oriented, commercially successful
MMMs) the station inhabits a curious 
place in radio. Mildly 'intellectual', it's 
designed for the 15-24 age group, the 
inheritors of a strange white liberal 
middle-class suburban landscape 
which can only be populated by the 
sort of 'typical' families of ABC 
dramas and sitcoms.
This is a far cry from the assumed JJJ 
audience of the 70s and early 80s: cof­
fee/beer/ coffee-skulling, trendy- 
haircutted, casually-university-
attending, t-shirt-wearing, already-
been-overseas-once-and-hope-to-go
-again-next-year music fans.
One might argue that it's better to 
cater for the odd suburban teen reject 
here and there as a Youth Network 
than to wallow in the Golden Oldies 
of the New Wave for the sake of an 
ageing band of 'Jays' lovers. Yet JJJ 
doesn't have many listeners these 
days anyway, probably because it 
doesn't play the music that the 
majority of kids really enjoy—it 
brings too much of its aged 
knowledge of what's gone before. 
Aussie MOR rocker Rick Price, for in­
stance, is hardly likely to get a look in 
on JJJ because he's not a 30 year-old's 
idea of what a 15 year-old should like.
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